

WELFARE, CON

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Answer to: Stim-bill changes not that different

**New welfare spending more than doubled
Rector and Bradley, '09**

[Robert E. and Katherine, Robert Rector is Senior Research Fellow in the Domestic Policy Studies Department and Katherine Bradley is a Research Fellow in the DeVos Center for Religion and Civil Society, at The Heritage Foundation. "Stimulus Bill Abolishes Welfare Reform and Adds New Welfare Spending." Heritage Institute, February 11. Date downloaded: March 17, 2009]

A major public policy success, welfare reform in the mid-1990s led to a dramatic reduction in welfare dependency and child poverty. This successful reform, however is now in jeopardy: Little-noted provisions in the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate stimulus bills actually abolish this historic reform. In addition, the stimulus bills will add nearly \$800 billion in new means-tested welfare spending over the next decade. This new spending amounts to around \$22,500 for every poor person in the U.S. The cost of the new welfare spending amounts, on average, to over \$10,000 for each family paying income tax.

Answer to: Stim changes needed

Changes were not needed to avert disaster

Rector and Bradley, '09

[Robert E. and Katherine, Robert Rector is Senior Research Fellow in the Domestic Policy Studies Department and Katherine Bradley is a Research Fellow in the DeVos Center for Religion and Civil Society, at The Heritage Foundation. "Stimulus Bill Abolishes Welfare Reform and Adds New Welfare Spending." Heritage Institute, February 11. Date downloaded: March 17, 2009]

Proponents of the stimulus plan might argue that these changes are necessary to help TANF weather the current recession. This is not true. Under existing TANF law, the federal government operates a TANF "contingency fund" with nearly \$2 billion in funding that can be quickly funneled to states that have rising unemployment. It should be noted that the existing contingency fund ties increased financial support to states to the objective external factor of unemployment; it specifically avoids a policy of funding states for increased welfare caseloads, recognizing the perverse incentives this could entail. If the authors of the stimulus bills merely wanted to provide states with more TANF funds in the current recession, they could have increased funding in the existing contingency fund. But they deliberately did not do this. Instead, they completely overturned the fiscal and policy foundations of welfare reform.

Solvency

Welfare must be decentralized to succeed

LeRoy and Clemens, '03

[Sylvia and Jason, Sylvia LeRoy is a policy analyst and Jason Clemens is Director of Fiscal Studies at the Fraser Institute in Canada, "Ending Welfare as We Know It: Lessons From Canada," National Center for Policy Analysis, September 25. <http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba457>. Date downloaded: March 17, 2009]

Currently, the Canadian federal government's involvement in welfare is restricted to determining the size of block transfers apportioned to the provinces. However, government accountability and the delivery of social programs would improve if Canada abolished the system of federal cash transfers to the provinces altogether and reduced federal taxes proportionately. Provinces could raise their own revenues to pay for the programs they deliver. This would unleash the potential of provinces to serve as laboratories of innovation in welfare administration and delivery. The conditions attached to federal welfare funds ultimately reinforce the taxing and spending power of the central government. That is true even if, as in the United States, the federal requirements include the desirable goals of raising caseload reduction targets or strengthening work requirements. In the United States, individual states have demonstrated the benefits of local experimentation and innovation in welfare policy. In Canada, provinces that have not undertaken reforms must reconsider the costs of their social programs. In both countries, if the objective of welfare reform is to rein in the welfare state, not empower it, the next step is to greater decentralization.

[Link to DA's on AFDC](#)

Welfare changes worse than pre-1996 program (AFDC)

Rector and Bradley, '09

[Robert E. and Katherine, Robert Rector is Senior Research Fellow in the Domestic Policy Studies Department and Katherine Bradley is a Research Fellow in the DeVos Center for Religion and Civil Society, at The Heritage Foundation. "Stimulus Bill Abolishes Welfare Reform and Adds New Welfare Spending." Heritage Institute, February 11. Date downloaded: March 17, 2009]

The welfare reform of 1996 replaced the old Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with a new program named Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). The key to welfare reform's reduction in dependency was the change in the funding structure of AFDC. Under the old AFDC program, states were given more federal funds if their welfare caseloads were increased, and funds were cut whenever the state caseload fell. This structure created a strong incentive for states to swell the welfare rolls. Prior to reform, one child in seven was receiving AFDC benefits. When welfare reform replaced the old AFDC system with TANF, this perverse financial incentive to increase dependence was eliminated. Each state was given a flat funding level that did not vary whether the state increased or decreased its caseload. In addition, states were given the goal of reducing welfare dependence (or at least of requiring welfare recipients to prepare for employment). The House and Senate stimulus bills will overturn the fiscal foundation of welfare reform and restore an AFDC-style funding system. For the first time since 1996, the federal government would begin paying states bonuses to increase their welfare caseloads. Indeed, the new welfare system created by the stimulus bills is actually worse than the old AFDC program because it rewards the states more heavily to increase their caseloads. Under the stimulus bills, the federal government will pay 80 percent of cost for each new family that a state enrolls in welfare; this matching rate is far higher than it was under AFDC.

Social implications, internal link

TANF uses gender to oppresses those on rolls

Josephson, '03

Jyl, "Coercive Visibility: Gender Deviance, TANF Reauthorization, and State Control of Low-Income Women and Men" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Aug 27, 2003
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/6/2/1/8/p62189_index.html Date downloaded:
March 17, 2009

Feminist scholars have noted that recent policy developments in the arena of intimate association are examples of contradictory trends in state regulation of families and intimate life (Fraser 1997, Mink 1998, Smith 2001). On the one hand, in redistributive policy areas such as public benefits for low-income families, the state has been reducing its support for families. On the other hand, the state has increased its intervention in the realms related to sexuality and the regulation of morality through laws such as the Defense of Marriage Acts (at federal and state levels) and the marriage incentives, family caps, and abstinence-only sex education funding in welfare law. This paper uses these feminist lenses to examine the social control and coercion of those who receive government benefits, and especially the control of women and men receiving TANF or whose children receive TANF. I focus on the current debate over the re-authorization of the 1996 welfare law, and proposals to extend state control over women who receive TANF benefits through the further extension of marriage incentives. The paper will examine H.R. 4, the current proposal for reauthorizing the TANF program, in particular with respect to provisions for marriage promotion. The paper argues that programs such as the marriage promotion and abstinence-only sex education initiatives in H.R. 4 [bill that reauthorized TANF] construct low-income women and men as both gender role deviants and as sexual deviants, the latter because they are failed heterosexuals. Thus, the paper uses the TANF program as an example of state coercion and the justification for such coercion for groups targeted due to gender, race, class, benefit status, and perceptions regarding sexual deviancy. It suggests that these policies focus our attention on individuals as pathological and deviant, and make invisible many salient aspects of contemporary poverty. In turn this focus justifies coercive treatment of these individuals based on their constructed status as deviants. Families and intimate association are matters that have both public and private dimensions in democratic polities. Ultimately these claims are about the nature of the political community and the extent to which it is responsive to claims regarding the unjust treatment of members and the exclusion of individuals and groups from the political process; thus, they are about the inclusion of all members in democratic decision-making. The coercive shaming of people who are the target of policies such as TANF acts as a justification for policies that actually harm the people they are purportedly providing with assistance.

Social implications internal link

Welfare, in any form, destroys social order

Conniff '94

[Ruth, "Big Bad Welfare – welfare reform politics and children," The Progressive, August.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1295/is_n8_v58/ai_15667744. Date downloaded: March 17, 2009]

"The act of getting pregnant if you are not prepared to care for a child is not morally neutral, it is a very destructive act," sociologist Charles Murray told the group. "And much as we may sympathize with a young woman who finds herself in that situation ... part of arranging society so that happens as seldom as possible is to impose terrible penalties on that act. The terrible penalties, he explained, include "severe social stigma" and poverty. In the United States, according to Murray, the social order has been disrupted by welfare: "The only way we have lifted the terrible penalties--economic penalties--of having a child out of wedlock is by intervening using the power of the state." In order to set things right, Murray said, we must restore the sanctions on single motherhood. "That means ending welfare in all its forms (even though I, for various reasons, say okay, we'll keep Medicaid).... And I have used the O-word, 'orphanage,' as a symbol for the kind of thing we must think about as an alternative."

Social Implications, brink

AFDC and welfare destabilized the entire social order

Kairys, '98

[David, "The politics of law: a progressive critique, 3rd ed." Basic Books, 1998.

<http://books.google.com/books?id=ubvKU4AfJ->

[YC&pg=PA578&lpg=PA578&dq=afdc+welfare+entitlement&source=bl&ots=khwM-AqGMf&sig=Ny2r8wYUReACsgxYKQjq76PZJd0&hl=en&ei=jri_SfSVCZDQnQfVp6Qw&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result](http://books.google.com/books?id=ubvKU4AfJ-YC&pg=PA578&lpg=PA578&dq=afdc+welfare+entitlement&source=bl&ots=khwM-AqGMf&sig=Ny2r8wYUReACsgxYKQjq76PZJd0&hl=en&ei=jri_SfSVCZDQnQfVp6Qw&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result) . Date

downloaded: March 17, 2009.]

The establishment of welfare as an entitlement [through AFDC], a right to even a small amount of cash for designated individuals from tax revenues, introduced a radically destabilizing concept to U.S. legal discourse in two distinct but related ways. At its most basic level, creating an entitlement that redistributed income exposed the socially created nature of all background rules of entitlement and exposed their distributive significance – that is, their role in maintaining inequality. In particular, the creation of an entitlement to welfare challenged and disrupted the nineteenth-century formulation of individual autonomy and independence as effort and exchange by equal participants within an unregulated market.

First, the new welfare jurisprudence exposed rights as socially chosen, not naturally given. And if entitlements and constructed, they can be reconstructed. From a technical legal perspective that was hardly news, but the political and cultural significance of that insight was deeply destabilizing. It revealed or, more accurately, resurfaced the fact that all property entitlements and therefore the redistribution of all wealth and power are the contingent product of political decisions. The current distribution of wealth is not inevitable, and indigence is not natural; both are socially and legally constituted.

Social implications, brink

Supreme Court upholds welfare benefits as entitled property

Finkleman, '06

[Paul, Prof. Harvard Law, President William McKinley Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy and Senior Fellow, Government Law Center, *Encyclopedia of American Civil Liberties*.

http://books.google.com/books?id=YoI14vYA8r0C&dq=afdc+welfare+entitlement&source=gbs_summary_s&cad=0.

Date downloaded: March 17, 2009]

Writing for the six-to-three majority [1968's *Goldberg v. Kelly*], Justice William Brennan noted that welfare benefits are "a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them," adding that "it may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like 'property' than a 'gratuity.'" Thus, the prohibition against deprivation of property with due process of law contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution applies to benefit termination.

Social implications, impact

“Right” to income grants government extensive power

Hazlitt ‘70

[Henry, Man vs. the Welfare State, (Arlington House, 1970). <http://mises.org/books/manwelfarestate.pdf> Date downloaded: MArch 17, 2009.]

If the right to these incomes should be withdrawn under *any* circumstances, government would have the power to deprive the individual not only of the pursuit of happiness, but also of liberty and even, in effect, of life itself. This *absolute right to a due-income* would be essentially a new principle of jurisprudence.

Social implication, impact

Welfare breeds entitlement, leads to revolts

Bylund, '06

[Per, "How the Welfare State Corrupted Sweden," Ludwig von Mises Institute, May 31. <http://mises.org/story/2190>.
Date downloaded: March 17, 2009]

The political change as the children of the welfare state grew up and started taking part in politics was massive. The rather communist student revolts of 1968 were probably the peak of this radical generation demanding more for themselves through state redistribution; they claimed no personal responsibility for their lives, nor ever thought of having to pitch in themselves. "I'm in need," they argued, and from that claim they directly inferred a right to satisfy that need — be it food, shelter, or a new car. Whereas my parents mysteriously seem to have inherited much of the "older" form of morality, most people of their age, and especially those younger, are paradigmatically different from their parents' generation. They are children of the welfare state and are fully aware of the social security benefits to which they have a "right." They don't reflect on where these benefits come from, but are skeptical towards politicians whom they believe might take them away. "Change" quickly became a bad word, since it necessarily implies a change to the system on which people are parasitically dependent.

Social implications, impact

Welfare is destroying the American family

Gilder, '94

[George, fellow at the Discovery Institute in Seattle. He is the author of the best-selling *Wealth and Poverty* and has written such books as *Recapturing the Spirit of Enterprise*, *Visible Man*, and *Men and Marriage*. He writes regularly for *Forbes*, *The Wall Street Journal*, and *The American Spectator*, among other journals., "Freedom from welfare dependency," *Action Institute, Religion and Liberty*, Vol. 4, Num. 2. March/April 1994.
http://www.acton.org/publications/randl/rl_interview_109.php. Date downloaded: March 17, 2009]

Essentially, welfare benefits are far better than low wage, entry-level jobs. Welfare gives benefits far superior to entry level jobs because they yield valuable leisure time for the recipient. Thus it usurps the male role as chief provider and undermines the foundation of families. His provider role is absolutely central to the family; if the state replaces the male provider, you don't have families. The welfare state cuckolds the man. That is why we have eighty percent illegitimacy rates in the inner cities. The welfare state has been far more destructive to the black family than slavery was.

Social implications, impact

Welfare states wars with middle class

Baskerville '08

[Stephen, Research Fellow with the Independent Institute, Associate Professor of Government at Patrick Henry College, and former President of the American Coalition for Fathers of Children. He holds a Ph.D. from the London School of Economics, and he has been a Fellow at the Howard Center for Family, Religion, and Society; Senior Lecturer of Political Science at Howard University, and as Chairman and Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics and European Studies at Palacky University in the Czech Republic., "From Welfare State to Police State," *Independent Review*, Vol. 12, Num 3, Winter. <http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?a=668> . Date downloaded: March 18, 2009.]

It is not called the welfare "state" for nothing. Unnoticed by reformers and even more striking than the economic effects have been subtle but far-reaching political developments. These developments involve the quiet metamorphosis of welfare from simply a system of public assistance into nothing less than a miniature penal apparatus, replete with its own tribunals, prosecutors, police, and punishments: juvenile and family courts, "matrimonial" lawyers, child protective services, domestic violence units, child-support enforcement agents, and other elements. Originally created to treat ills endemic to low-income, single-parent homes, this machinery is increasingly intervening with police actions in middle-class families. Kafkaesque in its logic, this machinery lends plausibility to the warnings, most famously by F. A. Hayek in *The Road to Serfdom* (1944), that socialist and welfare-state principles would eventually threaten not only economic prosperity, but also civil freedom.

Welfare is cyclical

Childhood receipt increases likelihood 20% as an adult (for African American women)

Vartanian, '99

[Thomas P., , "Childhood Conditions and Adult Welfare Use: Examining Neighborhood and Family Factors," National Council on Family Relations, Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Feb., 1999), pp. 225-237. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/353896>. Date downloaded: March 17, 2009.]

For the entire sample, the number of years that welfare was received as a child does not affect welfare receipt as an adult. In results not presented here, AFDC income during childhood did not make a difference in the likelihood of receiving AFDC as an adult for any of the groups. However, for African American women, the amount of time that welfare is received in childhood makes a difference in the probability estimates for receiving welfare as an adult. African American girls who lived in households where no AFDC payments were re-received had around a 40% likelihood of receiving AFDC as an adult, whereas African American girls who lived in households where AFDC was re-received every year had almost a 60% likelihood of receiving AFDC as an adult. Parental welfare receipt has an insignificant coefficient estimate for White women. Thus it appears that even when income, marital status, neighborhood characteristics, and other factors are controlled in models examining African American families, there is still an intergenerational effect of receiving AFDC for these girls when they become adults. These intergenerational effects do not appear to exist for White girls.

Welfare is cyclical

Community or parental participation in welfare reduces income

Corcoran, et al. '92

[Mary, All four authors are at the University of Michigan. Corcoran is a professor of political science, public policy, and social work. Gordon is a professor of economics. Laren is a research associate at the Institute for Social Research. Solon is an associate professor of economics and public policy., "The Association between Men's Economic Status and Their Family and Community Origins," The Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Autumn, 1992), pp. 575-601. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/146076> . Date downloaded: March 17, 2009]

One of our strongest results is the large negative association between son's outcomes and welfare receipt in his family of origin. This result is most apparent in Columns 4-8 of Table 2. In Columns 9-10 and in Table 3, the role of family welfare income is more difficult to assess because of the presence of the interaction term with the community welfare program participation rate. To facilitate interpretation of the results in Table 3, we have calculated their implications for various combinations of family and community welfare receipt. In particular, for each outcome variable, Table 4 displays the estimated effect of each permutation of three levels of family welfare income and three levels of community participation. The table presents zero family welfare income and a 1 percent community participation rate as the reference category and then shows the estimated relative effects of alternative combinations. Examination of the table reveals that family welfare income still appears to be negatively associated with the outcome variables, especially at lower levels of community participation.¹⁹

Welfare is failing disabled individuals

Many states deny exemptions for the permanently disabled

Wilkins '03

[Andrea, "TANF and Disabled Parents," National Conference of State Legislatures, March.

<http://www.ncsl.org/statefed/welfare/parent.pdf>. Date downloaded: March 17, 2009]

Before the enactment of the TANF program, caregivers and those with physical or mental disabilities were exempt from work requirements. Today, unless the state has granted them an exemption, these individuals are expected to comply with time limit and work participation policies. Although exemptions are available in most states, they are generally aimed at those with temporary disabilities who may be able to work with the assistance of specialized services or workplace accommodations. Those recipients who have not received an exemption are likely to encounter great difficulties complying with the program work requirements. These individuals are at risk of sanction or may exhaust their lifetime limit on receipt of cash assistance, without having secured steady employment or income.

This issue is further complicated by the fact that many TANF recipients experience a health problem severe enough to prevent them from working but not severe enough to qualify for SSI. These impairments can include health problems such as diabetes or asthma, mental disorders including social anxiety or severe depression, chronic pain problems, or learning disabilities. However, those who do have a health problem severe enough to qualify for SSI payments may need to rely on TANF while their pending SSI application makes its way through the lengthy approval or appeals process. These individuals often are forced to expend their limited months on TANF, bringing them closer to the expiration of the time limit.

US is a welfare state, Link

The US is a welfare state

Schuyt, et al '06

[Prof. Theo Schuyt, ph.d, Marieke de Boer, Elvira Wilthagen, Karin van Zanen, "Mapping the philanthropic contributions of service clubs: the Dutch case," Vrije Universiteit, Department of Philanthropic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, June 14. <http://www.istr.org/conferences/bangkok/WPVOLUME/Schuyt.Theo.pdf> Date downloaded: March 18, 2009.]

In terms of Mishra's definition the United States is a welfare state, but one of the residual type. Government has guaranteed only a little minimum of societal tasks. Most Western European states have, what Mishra calls an institutional model of welfare state: social security, healthcare and education are governmentally regulated. They are institutionalized on a legally base.

US is a welfare state, Link

US is a welfare state

Steiner '72

[Gilbert Y, The State of Welfare, (Brookings, 1972), pp. 272. <http://www.questia.com/library/book/the-state-of-welfare-by-gilbert-y-steiner.jsp> Date downloaded: March 18, 2009.]

Let there be no doubt, The United States is now a welfare state. But the United States is not a welfare state by constitutional compulsion. Indeed, it became a welfare state by powerful constitutional resistance: federalism and, ironically, notions of individual rights – economic liberty and freedom of contract – held the welfare state back for half a century; and a constitutional amendment was required to permit the progressive income tax which was essential to make the welfare state possible.

Welfare leads to war, internal link

Welfare leads to conflict between capitalistic countries

Smith and Little '06

[Richard and Michael, eds, Perspectives on World Politics, (Routledge 2006), pp. 356.
http://books.google.com/books?id=tWZN2Yos2mEC&dq=welfare+leads+to+war&source=gbs_summary_s&cad=0.
Date downloaded: March 18, 2009.]

One could even argue that the advent of national welfare states has accentuated the economic conflicts among capitalistic societies. The new commitment to the capitalist welfare state to full employment and domestic economic well-being causes it to substitute interventionist policies for the free play of market forces and hereby bring it into conflict with the policies of other states pursuing a similar set of economic goals. Welfare states are potentially highly nationalistic because governments have become accountable to their citizenry for the elimination of economic suffering; sometimes the best way to achieve this goal is to pass on economic difficulties to other societies. In times of economic crisis, public pressures encourage national governments to shift the burdens of unemployment and economic adjustment to other societies; this, economic and interstate competition through the market mechanism subtly shifts to interstate conflict for economic and political advantage. This nationalistic struggle to gain economic advantage and to shift the costs of economic distress to others again threatens the future of international capitalism.

Welfare leads to war, internal link

The welfare state's foundation is in violence, leads to war

Anderson '02

[William, teaches economics at Frostburg State University in Maryland, and is an adjunct scholar of the Ludwig von Mises Institute., "The Progressives' 100 Year War," Lew Rockwell, February 7.

<http://www.lewrockwell.com/anderson/anderson48.html> . Date downloaded: March 18, 2009.]

Yet, while wars might benefit progressivist movements, how does one make the most important link, that being that progressivism itself leads to war? Why is the warfare state a necessary ally of the welfare state? After all, most self-styled peace activists openly support the welfare state while rejecting the warfare state, yet I am also including them into the mix – albeit without their permission and certainly over their sure objections. The reason that I do this is that both states require that governments engage in violence, whether it be open like in warfare or whether it be implied, as in welfare. Contrary to popular belief, the welfare state is not based upon sharing, caring, and civilized behavior. If that were so, no coercion would be needed to make the system work. Instead, we implicitly understand that the welfare state is at its roots a police state, one that depends upon forcible extraction of wealth and property from some in order to give to those who have received favor from political authorities. Furthermore, the ideology of the welfare state – which is basically socialism at the core – is expansionist and messianic, something that encourages that it be spread abroad. Thus, we saw the French Revolution morph into the Napoleonic conquests and the aggressiveness of the communist regimes of the 20th Century.

Increases unemployment, impact

Tax to pay for welfare increases unemployment

Phelps '94

[EDMUND S. PHELPS, prof. of Economics, Columbia University, "Low-Wage Employment Subsidies versus the Welfare State," AEA Papers and Proceedings, <http://www.columbia.edu/~esp2/lowwage.pdf> Date downloaded: March 18, 2009.]

The welfare system harms disadvantaged workers through its impacts on the availability of jobs, on the overall reward from work, and on the morale of disadvantaged communities. On the unemployment impacts, my multivariate study of the postwar OECD economies, with Gylfi Zoega, found that the payroll tax is a powerful determinant of the natural unemployment rate. Its rise, much of it to finance welfare spending, is a major source of the increase in the natural rate from the 1960's to recent years (Phelps, 1994). The steeper rise of this tax in Europe than in the United States helps to explain the far larger rise of the natural rate there.

Increases unemployment, impact

Welfare/unemployment benefits increase the propensity to quit

Phelps '94

[EDMUND S. PHELPS, prof. of Economics, Columbia University, "Low-Wage Employment Subsidies versus the Welfare State," AEA Papers and Proceedings, <http://www.columbia.edu/~esp2/lowwage.pdf> Date downloaded: March 18, 2009.]

My new work emphasizes that employees' average propensity to quit (and also to shirk, to be an absentee, etc.) is a function not only of the unemployment rate and their relative wage, as before, but also of the ratio of their wage (or of the standard wage) to their average *nonwage income*, income from wealth plus net transfers. Workers' nonwage income, or unearned income and that of family and friends bolsters their willingness to quit (also, to shirk, etc.), at the risk of losing their jobs. In this asset-enriched model, *a payroll tax* is not neutral: it has a negative impact on the demand wage (by adding to firms' costs), but less so on the required incentive wage (since it does not tax away any nonwage income). Both the wage and employment fall, unemployment rising to a new and higher natural level.