

Soft Power and Hegemony
Version 1.0

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Soft Power Shell (AFF)

A. Unique Internal Link: Anti-Americanism is rising worldwide, and it undercuts support for U.S. policies. New initiatives are needed to build trust and respect globally

Gerson, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, '07

[Michael J. Gerson, Roger Hertog Senior Fellow, CFR, former Assistant to the President for Policy and Strategic Planning (2005-2006); former Assistant to the President for Speechwriting and Policy Adviser (2002-2005); "One Tool America Needs," Editorial, Washington Post, August 1, page A17, l/n]

Having stepped out of the warm bath of global affection that followed the Sept. 11 attacks, Americans are feeling shivery and exposed.

Anti-Americanism, as measured by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, has risen since 2002 in much of the world, particularly in the predominantly Muslim societies of the Middle East and Asia -- though the American brand remains fairly strong in places such as India, Japan, Latin America and Africa. A nation whose founding document urges a "decent respect to the opinions of mankind" is naturally anxious when those opinions sour.

Some of this damage is self-inflicted, resulting from the obscenities of Abu Ghraib and the apparently permanent limbo of Guantanamo Bay. American support for Israel is a source of global anger, especially in societies that believe the Jewish state should be located at the bottom of the Mediterranean. World opinion is impatient, not only for America to abandon Iraq but for America and NATO to leave Afghanistan. And some of this resentment reflects a very different historical moment from 2002. It is easy for a nation to gain sympathy as a victim, harder when acting in its own interests.

Whatever the causes, anti-Americanism makes it more difficult to gather support for a range of policies, from opposing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to protecting civilians in Darfur. There is an urgent need for American initiatives that build trust and respect in the world.

Soft Power Shell (AFF)

B. Link: Foreign Aid to reduce disease increases American soft power, and legitimizes U.S. hard power leadership

Nye, Professor of International Relations, Harvard, 9-13-07

[Joseph S., "VIEW: America and global public goods," September 13, *Daily Times* (Pakistan), download date: 9-29-07, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C09%5C13%5Cstory_13-9-2007_pg3_3]

America is currently transfixed with the problem it has created for itself in Iraq, but the presidential candidates are also beginning to ask what principles should guide United States foreign policy after Iraq. In my view, a focus on global public goods — things everyone can consume without diminishing their availability to others — could help America reconcile its preponderant power with others' interests.

Of course, pure public goods are rare. Most only partially approach the ideal case of clean air, where none can be excluded and all can benefit simultaneously. Combating global climate change is probably the most dramatic current case.

If the largest beneficiary of a public good (like the US) does not take the lead in devoting disproportionate resources toward its provision, smaller beneficiaries are unlikely to be able to produce it because of the difficulties of organising collective action when large numbers are involved. While this responsibility often lets others become "free riders," the alternative is no ride for anyone.

The US could gain doubly, both from the public goods themselves, and from the way they legitimise its preponderant power in the eyes of others. America can learn from the lesson of the nineteenth century, when Great Britain was a preponderant power and took the lead in maintaining the balance of power between Europe's major states, promoting an open international economic system, and maintaining freedom of the seas.

These issues remain relevant today, and the establishment of rules that preserve access for all remains as much a public good now as it was then, even though some of the issues are more complex. Maintaining regional balances of power and dampening local incentives to use force to change borders provides a public good for many (but not all) countries. Similarly, maintaining open global markets is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for alleviating poverty in poor countries even as it benefits the US.

Today, however, global public goods include new issues — not only climate change, but also preservation of endangered species, outer space, and the "virtual commons" of cyberspace. A reasonable consensus in American public opinion supports ensuring both these and the "classic" global public goods, even if the US has failed to lead on some issues, notably global climate.

There are also three new dimensions of global public goods in today's world. First, the US should take the lead in helping to develop and maintain international laws and institutions to organise collective action to deal with not only trade and the environment, but also weapons proliferation, peacekeeping, human rights, and other concerns. Others benefit from the order that such efforts provide, but so does the US. Likewise, while unilateralists complain that the US is constrained by international regimes, so are others.

Second, the US should make international development a higher priority. Much of the poor majority of the world is mired in a vicious circle of disease, poverty, and political instability. Financial and scientific help from rich countries is important not only for humanitarian reasons, but also to prevent failed states from becoming sources of disorder for the rest of the world.

Here, too, America's record is less than impressive. Protectionist trade measures often hurt poor countries most, and foreign assistance is generally unpopular with the American public. Development will take a long time, and the international community needs to explore better ways to make sure that help actually reaches the poor, but both prudence and a concern for soft power suggest that the US should take the lead.

Finally, as a preponderant power, the US can provide an important public good by acting as a mediator and convener. By using its good offices to mediate conflicts in places like Northern Ireland, Morocco, and the Aegean Sea, the US has helped in shaping international order in ways that are beneficial to other nations.

The Middle East is the crucial current case. It is sometimes tempting to let intractable conflicts fester, and there are some situations where other countries can play the mediator's role more effectively. Even when the US does not want to take the lead, it can share leadership with others, such as with Europe in the Balkans. But often the US is the only country that can bring parties together.

When successful, such leadership increases American soft power while reducing sources of instability. The US can also encourage other countries to share in production of such public goods. Welcoming the rise of Chinese power in terms of that country's becoming a "responsible stakeholder" is an invitation to begin such a dialogue.

Nevertheless, the US is likely to remain the world's preponderant power even after it extricates itself from Iraq. But it will have to learn to work with other countries to share leadership. That will require combining the soft power of attraction with the hard power of military might to produce a "smart power" strategy for providing global public goods.

Soft Power Shell (AFF)

C. Impact: U.S. leadership and hegemony prevents proliferation and global nuclear war

Khalilzad, Director, Strategy and Doctrine Program, RAND, '95

[Zalmay, "Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War," *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring, lexis-nexis]

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system

Uniqueness: Soft Power Low

U.S. Soft Power is Low across the world in Status Quo

Sydney Morning Herald '07

[“How the Mighty are Fallen,” January 23, 2007, accessed: 9-29-07

<http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/how-the-mighty-are-fallen/2007/01/23/1169330868042.html#>]

Global opinion on American foreign policy and the role of the US in world affairs, especially in the Middle East, has plunged to new lows, with overwhelming condemnation of its handling of the war in Iraq. An authoritative BBC World Service survey of more than 26,000 people from 25 countries across Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Middle East shows that nearly three in four people disapprove of how the US has dealt with Iraq over the past 12 months. Respondents were polled in November and December - before the announcement by the US President, George Bush, of his new surge strategy in Iraq, and his plans to send an extra 21,500 troops into Baghdad to quell the sectarian violence gripping the capital. The polling also showed global public opinion was against US handling of detainees at Guantanamo Bay, where David Hicks has been held without trial for more than five years, with 67 per cent of respondents opposed.

Assistance ↑ Soft Power & Support (in SSA)

Assistance is popular among Sub-Saharan African countries and ensures support for the U.S.

Moehler, Visiting Scholar, Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies, '07

[Devra C., also currently Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University; Ph.D., Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, "African View of the United States," Address to House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 28, <http://www.house.gov/delahunt/Moehlertestimony.pdf> download date: 9-28-07]

Much of the world has experienced a growing wave of anti-American sentiment in recent years. Various polls and attitudinal surveys appear to discern growing hostility to American foreign policy as well as to American society and culture. Yet, in Sub Saharan Africa, attitudes about the United States are generally positive. While anti-Americanism in the Middle East, Europe, and Latin America has attracted considerable attention, scholars have largely ignored the positive example of Africa. My research examines causes of African pro-Americanism, in hopes of assisting in the preservation of positive sentiments in Africa, and as means for discovering what might help improve America's image elsewhere.

My analysis of public opinion polls suggests that Africans are exposed to positive images of the United States through their media. African governments dependent on foreign assistance have a lot to lose from publicly criticizing western powers. News programs created by state-controlled media houses, as well as international programs from western sources, are likely to be especially flattering of the U.S. (and Europe). Contrary to my initial expectations, knowledge of U.S. foreign policies does not seem to affect attitudes about America. However, the tone of specific sources does appear to matter—with television (still largely state-controlled), international programs, personal contacts and travel to America expanding support for the United States and radio and internet use reducing it.

The data is also consistent with the argument that Africans approve of the U.S. because they view it as source of economic and political opportunity as well as being the focus of an enticing popular culture. Interestingly, the U.S. does not seem to benefit relative to Europe from its historical image as an anti-colonial power or its image as a multi-racial society. If anything, former colonial powers seem to benefit from their larger historical or current involvement in Africa. The statistical results imply that greater access to American goods, business opportunities, cultural exchanges, development resources and democracy assistance would be welcomed by Africans, and would help to ensure that the U.S. retains its many friends among the African mass public.

Assistance to Africa brings dependency and secures support for U.S.-led coalitions

Moehler, Visiting Scholar, Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies, '07

[Devra C., also currently Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University; Ph.D., Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, "African View of the United States," Address to House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 28, download date: 9-28-07, <http://www.house.gov/delahunt/Moehlertestimony.pdf>]

What effect does the abundance of popular support for the United States within Africa have on political outcomes? My contention is that the direct effects of public opinion on government policies are likely to be somewhat muted in Africa where leaders have little leverage vis-à-vis the United States. African governments are heavily dependent on foreign assistance and face potentially devastating expected costs for acting against U.S. interests on important issues, even if their publics support them. Eritrea and Ethiopia joined the "coalition of the willing" in order to curry favor with international power brokers and donors, not because of demands from their populations.

Health Assistance ↑ Soft Power (in SSA)

Health Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa builds pro-American sentiment and soft power

Gerson, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, '07

[Michael J. Gerson, Roger Hertog Senior Fellow, CFR, former Assistant to the President for Policy and Strategic Planning (2005-2006); former Assistant to the President for Speechwriting and Policy Adviser (2002-2005); "One Tool America Needs," Editorial, Washington Post, August 1, page A17, l/n]

Having stepped out of the warm bath of global affection that followed the Sept. 11 attacks, Americans are feeling shivery and exposed. Anti-Americanism, as measured by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, has risen since 2002 in much of the world, particularly in the predominantly Muslim societies of the Middle East and Asia -- though the American brand remains fairly strong in places such as India, Japan, Latin America and Africa. A nation whose founding document urges a "decent respect to the opinions of mankind" is naturally anxious when those opinions sour.

Some of this damage is self-inflicted, resulting from the obscenities of Abu Ghraib and the apparently permanent limbo of Guantanamo Bay. American support for Israel is a source of global anger, especially in societies that believe the Jewish state should be located at the bottom of the Mediterranean. World opinion is impatient, not only for America to abandon Iraq but for America and NATO to leave Afghanistan. And some of this resentment reflects a very different historical moment from 2002. It is easy for a nation to gain sympathy as a victim, harder when acting in its own interests.

Whatever the causes, anti-Americanism makes it more difficult to gather support for a range of policies, from opposing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to protecting civilians in Darfur. There is an urgent need for American initiatives that build trust and respect in the world.

Yet Congress has chosen this moment to gut one of the most innovative and effective American outreach efforts since the Peace Corps. The Millennium Challenge Corp. is grown-up foreign aid. Under this three-year-old program, a board certifies countries that are likely to use assistance wisely -- nations committed to democratic and free-market reform and fighting corruption -- and works with them as partners on projects to combat poverty and encourage economic growth. Nations that backtrack on reform and good governance have their "compacts" cut off, causing humiliation and occasional repentance. After a slow start, the MCC has made agreements with 13 nations. But at a recent breakfast, Ambassador John Danilovich, who heads the program, was in a state of dignified bewilderment. The Senate Appropriations Committee, demonstrating bipartisan shortsightedness, had just reduced funding for the MCC from the administration's \$3 billion request to \$1.2 billion, throwing future compacts into question. "Why," he asked, "do they want to undermine a foreign policy lever which is actually working?"

Danilovich was fresh from a meeting with America's traditional Nicaraguan nemesis, President Daniel Ortega. Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chavez has been courting Ortega and his leftist Sandinista comrades with elaborate (and so far unfulfilled) promises of aid. But Danilovich found Ortega enthusiastic about Nicaragua's MCC compact, which helps increase the income of rural farmers. The MCC is the main counterweight to Chavez's influence in that country, allowing America to maintain ties with the Nicaraguan people even as political relations with the government grow complicated.

This program also provides tangible rewards for reform in the Islamic world. A compact with Morocco is due to be announced later this month. Jordan is working toward its own agreement. And when Yemen was suspended from the MCC in 2005, it undertook a series of anti-corruption reforms in order to be reinstated.

Danilovich calls this "the MCC effect." Since the global competition for compacts is vigorous, nations are willing to make major changes to receive them.

In Lesotho, parliament has granted married women the right to own land -- previously they were considered legal minors -- in order to qualify for MCC aid. In Georgia, the government fired 15,000 corrupt policemen. When I worked at the White House, the finance minister of an African country seeking MCC funds once said to me: "I keep telling others in my government that we've got to do better fighting corruption. We've got to compete."

The same Pew survey that shows growing anti-Americanism reveals something more hopeful: Eight of the 10 countries most favorable to the United States in the world are in sub-Saharan Africa. It is not a coincidence that American bilateral assistance to African countries over the past six years -- to fight AIDS, malaria and poverty -- has quadrupled. As a rule, people do not hate you when you save their children.

Congressional reductions in MCC funding would bite agreements on the African continent first. Tanzania could have its compact reduced significantly. Burkina Faso might be cut off entirely. Then Jordan and Bolivia could have their agreements delayed indefinitely. And our country would forgo a great deal of goodwill.

America needs tools of influence other than the tools of war. And when we have them, they should not be carelessly discarded.

Health Assistance ↑ Soft Power

Health Assistance fosters positive international relations and boosts American soft power

Ikenberry, Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University, **and Slaughter**, Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, '06

[G. John and Anne-Marie, "Forging A World of Liberty Under the Law: U.S. national security in the 21st century," September 27, 2006, The Princeton Project on National Security, www.wps.princeton.edu/ppns/report/FinalReport.pdf
Download date: 9-30-07]

At the same time, these networks can reach out to ordinary citizens' groups and private-sector companies to tackle problems affecting health and the environment. The result will be to create many points of contact across societies as well as governments – points of contact that speed communication and gradually foster trust through deepening relationships. Communicating attractive values and practices by the United States and other liberal democracies to developing countries also enhances our soft power. Only these types of networks – at the national, regional or provincial, and even local levels – can reach far within states in the ways necessary to address domestic conditions and problems that produce global threats. They must be issue-specific and based on common interests with specific countries. At the same time, they must become the conduits for communicating and inculcating the values and practices that safeguard liberty under law. And they must coexist with an open commitment by the United States and as many other governments as will join us to bring all governments up to PAR and to ensure that all governments, even those of established liberal democracies, remain at PAR.

Health Assistance ↑ Soft Power

Funding of global health programs is increases American soft power and leadership

Kickbusch, Senior Health Policy Advisor, Swiss Federal Government, '02

[Ilona, global health consultant, former Professor of Global Health at Yale Medical School, 1998-2004; former Director, Division of Health Promotion, Education, and Communication at World Health Organization (WHO) headquarters in Geneva, 1994-1998; Ph.D. in Political Science and Sociology, magna cum laude, University of Konstanz, Germany in 1981; "Influence and opportunity: Reflections on the US role in global public health," *Health Affairs*, November/December 2002, Vol. 21, Issue 6; pg 131, proquest, 07/11/07]

In his recent analysis of U.S. foreign policy, Joseph Nye, dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, argued that the United States must come to terms with what he calls the paradox of American power: The stronger the United States is, the more it must orient itself toward a new global community. It must rely less on traditional measures of power such as military strength and more on the "soft" power that comes from culture, values, and institutions.¹ This differentiation between hard and soft power has been a major subtext of all discussions on America's role in the new global environment since the fall of the Berlin Wall and in particular in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. In the face of a global health crisis, Nye's paradox can help to define a new role that America can play. This role would imply strengthening the U.S. soft-power role in health by moving beyond both a national-interest paradigm and an international disease-control model based on macroeconomic arguments. A key dimension of this new global health strategy would be to address the larger issues of social justice, democracy, and law that are paramount to health in the context of globalization and that are part of U.S. political tradition. The global community expects the United States to take soft-power leadership. The repeated suggestion of a new Marshall Plan or the call to contribute more generously to the new Global Fund on AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria is not just about more dollars. It is the plea of the global community that the United States apply the strength of vision and determination that it has shown in other historical crises to health and development today.

Assistance ↑ Soft Power & Support (general)

Increasing health assistance to Africa increases American soft power

Nye, Professor of International Relations, Harvard, '04

[Joseph, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, pages 61-62]

In the twenty-first century the United States has an interest in maintaining a degree of international order. It needs to influence distant governments and organizations on a variety of issues such as proliferation and weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, drugs, trade, resources and ecological damage that affect Americans as well as others. The United States, like nineteenth-century Britain, also has an interest in keeping international markets and global commons, such as the oceans, open to all. To a large extent, international order is a public good—something everyone can consume without diminishing its availability to others. Of course, pure public goods are rare. And sometimes things that look good to Americans may not look good to everyone else, and that is why consultation is important. A large country like the United States gains doubly when it promotes public goods: from the goods themselves, and from the way that being a major provider legitimizes and increases its soft power. Thus when the Bush administration announced that it would increase its development assistance and take the lead in combating HIV/AIDS, it meant the United States would not only benefit from the markets and stability that might be produced, but also by enhancing its attractiveness or soft-power resources. International development is also an important global public good. Nonetheless, American foreign aid was .1 percent of GDP, roughly one-third of the European levels, and protectionist trade measures, particularly in agriculture and textiles, hurt poor countries more than the value of the aid provided. According to one index that tries to evaluate how well rich countries help the poor by including trade, environment, investment, migration, and peacekeeping along with actual aid, the United States ranks twentieth out of 21 (just ahead of Japan). Despite the Bush administration's efforts, the United States has a distance to go to gain soft-power resources in the development area.

Foreign Assistance boosts American soft power

Kurlantzick, Scholar, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, '05

[Joshua, visiting scholar in the Carnegie Endowment's China Program and a fellow at the USC School of Public Diplomacy and the Pacific Council on International Policy; previously foreign editor at The New Republic; "The Decline of American Soft Power," December 2005, *Current History*, Volume 104, Issue 686; pg. 419, proquest, accessed 7-10-07]

The game is not lost. As Nye himself notes, the United States recovered from a previous decline in soft power after the Vietnam War. Other recent examples suggest the same—in the wake of a concerted American response to the December 2004 Asian tsunami, complemented by solid public diplomacy, the image of the United States in Indonesia this year has improved. And the United States still clearly possesses a soft power lead over its nearest rivals. It remains the world's most powerful economic actor, and it retains hard power credentials that will augment its soft power for years to come. Still, the administration must realize that it is doing long-term damage to American soft power, and that it can reverse its losses. Doing so would require a multifaceted initiative. First, it would involve a clear and concrete public diplomacy strategy. Hughes or another czar needs to create a public diplomacy structure within the State Department that makes sense, better integrating public diplomacy officers into embassies around the world and placing a specialist on the National Security Council to help coordinate public diplomacy efforts with broader US policy. In the field, public diplomacy should cater to host countries and emphasize cultural ties by reopening American centers and boosting academic and cultural exchange programs. It should highlight US development assistance, support for political reform, and willingness to listen to locals on what kinds of aid to provide. A study of public perceptions of the United States in Morocco found that "informing people about aid in the areas in which America's strengths are acknowledged"—in Morocco, primarily democracy assistance—"had a significant positive effect on the attitudes of focus group members."

Disease Assistance to Africa ↑ Soft Power

Assistance to Africa to combat disease increases Soft Power

Nye, Professor of International Relations, Harvard, '04

[Joseph S., "Soft Power and American Foreign Policy," Summer 2004, *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 119, Issue 2; page 255, proquest, download date: 7-11-07]

On the substance of policy, the Bush administration deserves credit for its efforts to align the United States with the long-term aspirations of poor people in Africa and elsewhere through its Millenium Challenge initiative, which promises to increase aid to countries willing to make reforms, as well as for its efforts to increase resources to combat AIDS and other infectious diseases. Success in implementing those programs will represent a significant investment in American soft power. So also will be the serious promotion of the peace process in the Middle East. As National security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said, "America is a country that really does have to be committed to values and to making life better for people around the world. . . . It's not just the sword, it's the olive branch that speaks to those intentions."³⁸

AIDS Assistance ↑ Soft Power

Increased U.S. Assistance on AIDS needed to boost American Soft Power and leadership

Zietz, Executive Director, Global AIDS Alliance, '07

[Paul, "AIDS fund needs more US help," July 8, 2007, *Contra Costa Times*, lexis-nexis]

The need for effectively targeted U.S. assistance is growing, not leveling off. In Zambia, for instance, 17 percent of the population is living with HIV, and there is a major tuberculosis threat as well, including extremely drug-resistant strains. Funding for TB treatment is lumped in with the AIDS budget, and countries in Asia as well as Africa need much more help tackling this deadly infection -- not only to protect their own populations but also to lower the risk of its spread to other countries. Leveling off funding also makes a mockery of America's global leadership. The fight against AIDS is now geared toward one overarching, U.S.-endorsed goal: universal access to all AIDS-related services by 2010. Of course, similar targets have been set, and missed, in the past. But in the post-9/11 world, promises to poor countries have taken on a new seriousness. It no longer will do for wealthy countries to issue vague excuses when the deadline arrives.

General Link Boosters: U.S. Foreign Policy Affects Soft Power

Foreign Policy does affect Soft Power and can build international support for other American policies

Nye, Professor of International Relations, Harvard, '04

[Joseph, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, pages 13-14]

Government policies at home and abroad are another potential source of soft power. For example, in the 1950s racial segregation at home undercut American soft power in Africa, and today the practice of capital punishment and weak gun control laws undercut American soft power in Europe. Similarly, foreign policies strongly affect soft power. Jimmy Carter's human rights policies are a case in point, as were government efforts to promote democracy in the Reagan and Clinton administrations. In Argentina, American human rights policies that were rejected by the military government of the 1970s produced considerable soft power for the United States two decades later, when the Peronists who were earlier imprisoned subsequently came to power. Policies can have long-term as well as short-term effects that vary as the context changes. The popularity of the United States in Argentina in the early 1990s reflected Carter's policies of the 1970s, and it led the Argentine government to support American policies in the UN and in the Balkans.

U.S. foreign policies are Key – policies influence support for American power

Nye, Professor of International Relations, Harvard, '04

[Joseph, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, pages 127-128]

A Eurobarometer poll found that a majority of Europeans believe that the United States tends to play a negative role in fighting global poverty, protecting the environment, and maintaining peace in the world. When asked in a Pew poll to what extent they thought the United States "takes your interests into account," a majority in 20 out of 42 countries surveyed said "Not too much" or "Not at all." In many countries, unfavorable ratings were highest among younger people. American pop culture may be widely admired among young people, but the unpopularity of our foreign policies is making the next generation question American power. American music and films are more popular in Britain, France, and Germany than they were 20 years ago, another period when American policies were unpopular in Europe, but the attraction of our policies is even lower than it was then. There are also hints that unpopular foreign policies might be spilling over and undercutting the attractiveness of some other aspects of American popular culture. A 2003 Roper study showed that "for the first time since 1998, consumers in 30 countries signaled their disenchantment with America by being less likely to buy Nike products or eat at McDonald's ... At the same time, 9 of the top 12 Asian and European firms, including Sony, BMW, and Panasonic, saw their scores rise.

U.S. Soft Power Can Rebound

U.S. image in Africa can recover despite the Bush Administration – new policies will be key

Moehler, Visiting Scholar, Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies, '07

[Devra C., also currently Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University; Ph.D., Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, "African View of the United States," Address to House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 28, 2007, <http://www.house.gov/delahunt/Moehlertestimony.pdf> download date: 9-28-07]

Nonetheless, it is clear that the unilateralism of the present administration is viewed negatively in the region, particularly by elites.

As citizens of poor countries, Africans are more likely to believe in the central importance of multilateralism and in the United Nations, and to oppose a foreign policy which systematically undermines that institution. It is difficult to tell whether the increasingly negative attitudes towards the present administration and its policies will translate into a more permanent shift in attitudes towards the United States. I suspect the answer to this question depends in large part on the evolution of American policy over the next decade. The U.S. retains a positive image because of general factors described in this testimony which have demonstrated lasting influence. But the U.S. may come to be viewed in a sharply different light in the coming years if current administration policies are sustained.

Soft Power is recoverable – post-Vietnam era proves that it can occur in just a few years

National Public Radio '07

["Bush Team Explores Use of 'Soft Power'" March 23, proquest]

NORTHAM: Francis Fukuyama with the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and author of "America at the Crossroads" says the whole nature of power itself needs to be re-examined in the context of increased terrorism and the insurgency in Iraq.

Professor FRANCIS FUKUYAMA (John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies): The way that you're trained to think about power is just different in the 21st century and it has to do with this world of weak states and transnational actors that just makes the old rules much less applicable.

NORTHAM: But one rule hasn't changed. If you're going to use hard or military power, you better win, says William Martel, an associate professor of International Security Studies at the Fletcher School at Tufts University.

Professor WILLIAM MARTEL (Fletcher School, Tufts University): If you don't get it right, you undermine the sense to which other societies respect and fear you, and it can encourage other states to challenge you.

NORTHAM: But analysts say the U.S. can regain that respect and leverage that it seems to have lost in recent years. The U.S. was pilloried for the policies it pursued during the Vietnam War. But within a few years after American troops pulled out of Vietnam, the U.S. had regained its prestige and diplomatic power.

Soft Power Good – General Impacts

Soft Power is key to building the international coalitions necessary to solve global problems, such as economic competitiveness, terrorism, war, proliferation, disease, human trafficking, and drugs

Kurlantzick, Scholar, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, '05

[Joshua, visiting scholar in the Carnegie Endowment's China Program and a fellow at the USC School of Public Diplomacy and the Pacific Council on International Policy; previously foreign editor at The New Republic; "The Decline of American Soft Power," December 2005, *Current History*, Vol. 104, Issue 686; pg. 419, proquest, accessed 07/10/07]

A broad decline in soft power has many practical implications. These include the drain in foreign talent coming to the United States, the potential backlash against American companies, the growing attractiveness of China and Europe, and the possibility that anti-US sentiment will make it easier for terrorist groups to recruit. In addition, with a decline in soft power, Washington is simply less able to persuade others. In the run-up to the Iraq War, the Bush administration could not convince Turkey, a longtime US ally, to play a major staging role, in part because America's image in Turkey was so poor. During the war itself, the United States has failed to obtain significant participation from all but a handful of major nations, again in part because of America's negative image in countries ranging from India to Germany. In attempts to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons, Washington has had to allow China to play a central role, partly because few Asian states view the United States as a neutral, legitimate broker in the talks. Instead, Washington must increasingly resort to the other option Nye discusses—force, or the threat of force. With foreign governments and publics suspicious of American policy, the White House has been unable to lead a multinational effort to halt Iran's nuclear program, and instead has had to resort to threatening sanctions at the United Nations or even the possibility of strikes against Iran. With America's image declining in nations like Thailand and Pakistan, it is harder for leaders in these countries to openly embrace counterterrorism cooperation with the United States, so Washington resorts to quiet arm-twisting and blandishments to obtain counterterror concessions. Force is not a long-term solution. Newer, nontraditional security threats such as disease, human trafficking, and drug trafficking can only be managed through forms of multilateral cooperation that depend on America's ability to persuade other nations. Terrorism itself cannot be defeated by force alone, a fact that even the White House recognizes. The 2002 National Security Strategy emphasizes that winning the war on terror requires the United States to lead a battle of ideas against the ideological roots of terrorism, in addition to rooting out and destroying individual militant cells.

Soft power is key to multilateral cooperation -- solves climate, disease, crime, and terrorism

Nye, Professor of International Relations, Harvard, '04

[Joseph S., "Soft Power and American Foreign Policy," Summer 2004, *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 119, Issue 2; page 255, proquest, download date: 9-21-07]

Power depends on context, and the distribution of power differs greatly in different domains. In the global information age, power is distributed among countries in a pattern that resembles a complex three-dimensional chess game. On the top chessboard of political-military issues, military power is largely unipolar, but on the economic board, the United States is not a hegemon or an empire, and it must bargain as an equal when Europe acts in a unified way. And on the bottom chessboard of transnational relations, power is chaotically dispersed, and it makes no sense to use traditional terms such as unipolarity, hegemony, or American empire. Those who recommend an imperial American foreign policy based on traditional military descriptions of American power are relying on woefully inadequate analysis. If you are in a three-dimensional game, you will lose if you focus only on one board and fail to notice the other boards and the vertical connections among them—witness the connections in the war on terrorism between military actions on the top board, where we removed a dangerous tyrant in Iraq, but simultaneously increased the ability of the al Qaeda network to gain new recruits on the bottom, transnational board. Because of its leading edge in the information revolution and its past investment in military power, the United States will likely remain the world's single most powerful country well into the twenty-first century. French dreams of a multipolar military world are unlikely to be realized anytime soon, and the German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, has explicitly eschewed such a goal. But not all the important types of power come out of the barrel of a gun. Hard power is relevant to getting the outcomes we want on all three chessboards, but many of the transnational issues, such as climate change, the spread of infectious diseases, international crime, and terrorism, cannot be resolved by military force alone. Representing the dark side of globalization, these issues are inherently multilateral and require cooperation for their solution. Soft power is particularly important in dealing with the issues that arise from the bottom chessboard of transnational relations. To describe such a world as an American empire fails to capture the real nature of the foreign policy tasks that we face.

Soft Power Sustains Hegemony

Soft Power helps build coalitions, alliances, and intelligence sharing. These are key factors in preserving American hegemony

Nye, Professor of International Relations, Harvard, '04

[Joseph S., "Soft Power and American Foreign Policy," Summer 2004, *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 119, Issue 2; page 255, proquest, download date: 9-21-07]

In the global information age, the attractiveness of the United States will be crucial to our ability to achieve the outcomes we want. Rather than having to put together pick-up coalitions of the willing for each new game, we will benefit if we are able to attract others into institutional alliances and eschew weakening those we have already created. NATO, for example, not only aggregates the capabilities of advanced nations, but its interminable committees, procedures, and exercises also allow these nations to train together and quickly become interoperable when a crisis occurs. As for alliances, if the United States is an attractive source of security and reassurance, other countries will set their expectations in directions that are conducive to our interests. Initially, for example, the U.S.-Japan security treaty was not very popular in Japan, but polls show that over the decades, it became more attractive to the Japanese public. Once that happened, Japanese politicians began to build it into their approaches to foreign policy. The United States benefits when it is regarded as a constant and trusted source of attraction so that other countries are not obliged continually to re-examine their options in an atmosphere of uncertain coalitions. In the Japan case, broad acceptance of the United States by the Japanese public "contributed to the maintenance of US hegemony" and "served as political constraints compelling the ruling elites to continue cooperation with the United States."¹⁸ Popularity can contribute to stability. Finally, as the RAND Corporation's John Arquila and David Ronfeldt argue, power in an information age will come not only from strong defenses but also from strong sharing. A traditional realpolitik mindset makes it difficult to share with others. But in an information age, such sharing not only enhances the ability of others to cooperate with us but also increases their inclination to do so. As we share intelligence and capabilities with others, we develop common outlooks and approaches that improve our ability to deal with the new challenges. Power flows from that attraction. Dismissing the importance of attraction as merely ephemeral popularity ignores key insights from new theories of leadership as well as the new realities of the information age. We cannot afford that.

Soft Power Prevents Terrorism

Soft Power key to the international cooperation that is vital to preventing terrorism

Nye, Professor of International Relations, Harvard, '04

[Joseph S., "Soft Power and American Foreign Policy," Summer 2004, *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 119, Issue 2; page 255, proquest, download date: 9-21-07]

Skeptics about soft power say not to worry. Popularity is ephemeral and should not be a guide for foreign policy in any case. The United States can act without the world's applause. We are so strong we can do as we wish. We are the world's only superpower, and that fact is bound to engender envy and resentment. Fouad Ajami has stated recently, "The United States need not worry about hearts and minds in foreign lands." IJ Columnist Cal Thomas refers to "the fiction that our enemies can be made less threatening by what America says and does."¹⁰ Moreover, the United States has been unpopular in the past, yet managed to recover. We do not need permanent allies and institutions. We can always pick up a coalition of the willing when we need to. Donald Rumsfeld is wont to say that the issues should determine the coalitions, not vice-versa. But it would be a mistake to dismiss the recent decline in our attractiveness so lightly. It is true that the United States has recovered from unpopular policies in the past, but that was against the backdrop of the Cold War, in which other countries still feared the Soviet Union as the greater evil. Moreover, while America's size and association with disruptive modernity are real and unavoidable, wise policies can soften the sharp edges of that reality and reduce the resentments that they engender. That is what the United States did after World War II. We used our soft power resources and co-opted others into a set of alliances and institutions that lasted for sixty years. We won the Cold War against the Soviet Union with a strategy of containment that used our soft power as well as our hard power. It is true that the new threat of transnational terrorism increased American vulnerability, and some of our unilateralism after September 11 was driven by fear. But the United States cannot meet the new threat identified in the national security strategy without the cooperation of other countries. They will cooperate, up to a point, out of mere self-interest, but their degree of cooperation is also affected by the attractiveness of the United States. Take Pakistan for example. President Pervez Musharraf faces a complex game of cooperating with the United States on terrorism while managing a large anti-American constituency at home. He winds up balancing concessions and retractions. If the United States were more attractive to the Pakistani populace, we would see more concessions in the mix.

Soft Power Prevents Terrorism

Soft Power boosts international cooperation and moderate Muslims; These are the key factors to preventing terrorism – military action alone is insufficient

Nye, Professor of International Relations, Harvard, '04

[Joseph S., "Soft Power and American Foreign Policy," Summer 2004, *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 119, Issue 2; page 255, proquest, download date: 9-21-07]

Some hard-line skeptics might say that whatever the merits of soft power, it has little role to play in the current war on terrorism. Osama bin Laden and his followers are repelled, not attracted by American culture, values, and policies. Military power was essential in defeating the Taliban government in Afghanistan, and soft power will never convert fanatics. Charles Krauthammer, for example, argued soon after the war in Afghanistan that our swift military victory proved that "the new unilateralism" worked. That is true up to a point, but the skeptics mistake half the answer for the whole solution. Look again at Afghanistan. Precision bombing and Special Forces defeated the Taliban government, but U.S. forces in Afghanistan wrapped up less than a quarter of al Qaeda, a transnational network with cells in sixty countries. The United States cannot bomb al Qaeda cells in Hamburg, Kuala Lumpur, or Detroit. Success against them depends on close civilian cooperation, whether sharing intelligence, coordinating police work across borders, or tracing global financial flows. America's partners cooperate partly out of self-interest, but the inherent attractiveness of U.S. policies can and does influence the degree of cooperation. Equally important, the current struggle against Islamist terrorism is not a clash of civilizations but a contest whose outcome is closely tied to a civil war between moderates and extremists within Islamic civilization. The United States and other advanced democracies will win only if moderate Muslims win, and the ability to attract the moderates is critical to victory. We need to adopt policies that appeal to moderates and to use public diplomacy more effectively to explain our common interests. We need a better strategy for wielding our soft power. We will have to learn better how to combine hard and soft power if we wish to meet the new challenges.

Impact: Leadership and Hegemony Good

U.S. leadership and hegemony prevents multiple scenarios for huge nuclear wars

Khalilzad, Director, Strategy and Doctrine Program, RAND, '95

[Zalmay, "Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War," *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring, lexis-nexis]

Realistically and over the longer term, however, a neo-isolationist approach might well increase the danger of major conflict, require a greater U.S. defense effort, threaten world peace, and eventually undermine U.S. prosperity. By withdrawing from Europe and Asia, the United States would deliberately risk weakening the institutions and solidarity of the world's community of democratic powers and so establishing favorable conditions for the spread of disorder and a possible return to conditions similar to those of the first half of the twentieth century. In the 1920s and 1930s, U.S. isolationism had disastrous consequences for world peace. At that time, the United States was but one of several major powers. Now that the United States is the world's preponderant power, the shock of a U.S. withdrawal could be even greater. What might happen to the world if the United States turned inward? Without the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), rather than cooperating with each other, the West European nations might compete with each other for domination of East-Central Europe and the Middle East. In Western and Central Europe, Germany -- especially since unification -- would be the natural leading power. Either in cooperation or competition with Russia, Germany might seek influence over the territories located between them. German efforts are likely to be aimed at filling the vacuum, stabilizing the region, and precluding its domination by rival powers. Britain and France fear such a development. Given the strength of democracy in Germany and its preoccupation with absorbing the former East Germany, European concerns about Germany appear exaggerated. But it would be a mistake to assume that U.S. withdrawal could not, in the long run, result in the renationalization of Germany's security policy. The same is also true of Japan. Given a U.S. withdrawal from the world, Japan would have to look after its own security and build up its military capabilities. China, Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia already fear Japanese hegemony. Without U.S. protection, Japan is likely to increase its military capability dramatically -- to balance the growing Chinese forces and still-significant Russian forces. This could result in arms races, including the possible acquisition by Japan of nuclear weapons. Given Japanese technological prowess, to say nothing of the plutonium stockpile Japan has acquired in the development of its nuclear power industry, it could obviously become a nuclear weapon state relatively quickly, if it should so decide. It could also build long-range missiles and carrier task forces. With the shifting balance of power among Japan, China, Russia, and potential new regional powers such as India, Indonesia, and a united Korea could come significant risks of preventive or proruptive war. Similarly, European competition for regional dominance could lead to major wars in Europe or East Asia. If the United States stayed out of such a war -- an unlikely prospect -- Europe or East Asia could become dominated by a hostile power. Such a development would threaten U.S. interests. A power that achieved such dominance would seek to exclude the United States from the area and threaten its interests-economic and political -- in the region. Besides, with the domination of Europe or East Asia, such a power might seek global hegemony and the United States would face another global Cold War and the risk of a world war even more catastrophic than the last. In the Persian Gulf, U.S. withdrawal is likely to lead to an intensified struggle for regional domination. Iran and Iraq have, in the past, both sought regional hegemony. Without U.S. protection, the weak oil-rich states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) would be unlikely to retain their independence. To preclude this development, the Saudis might seek to acquire, perhaps by purchase, their own nuclear weapons. If either Iraq or Iran controlled the region that dominates the world supply of oil, it could gain a significant capability to damage the U.S. and world economies. Any country that gained hegemony would have vast economic resources at its disposal that could be used to build military capability as well as gain leverage over the United States and other oilimporting nations. Hegemony over the Persian Gulf by either Iran or Iraq would bring the rest of the Arab Middle East under its influence and domination because of the shift in the balance of power. Israeli security problems would multiply and the peace process would be fundamentally undermined, increasing the risk of war between the Arabs and the Israelis. The extension of instability, conflict, and hostile hegemony in East Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulf would harm the economy of the United States even in the unlikely event that it was able to avoid involvement in major wars and conflicts. Higher oil prices would reduce the U.S. standard of living. Turmoil in Asia and Europe would force major economic readjustment in the United States, perhaps reducing U.S. exports and imports and jeopardizing U.S. investments in these regions. Given that total imports and exports are equal to a quarter of U.S. gross domestic product, the cost of necessary adjustments might be high. The higher level of turmoil in the world would also increase the likelihood of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and means for their delivery. Already several rogue states such as North Korea and Iran are seeking nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. That danger would only increase if the United States withdrew from the world. The result would be a much more dangerous world in which many states possessed WMD capabilities; the likelihood of their actual use would increase accordingly. If this happened, the security of every nation in the world, including the United States, would be harmed.

Impact: Leadership and Hegemony Good

Collapse of U.S. leadership and hegemony results in an apolar, chaotic world filled with economic depression and nuclear war

Ferguson, Professor of History, New York University, '04

[Niall, also a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, "When Empires Wane. The End of Power: Without American hegemony the world would likely return to the dark ages," June 21,

<http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110005244> download date: 9-29-07)

Yet universal claims were an integral part of the rhetoric of that era. All the empires claimed to rule the world; some, unaware of the existence of other civilizations, maybe even believed that they did. The reality, however, was political fragmentation. And that remains true today. The defining characteristic of our age is not a shift of power upward to supranational institutions, but downward. If free flows of information and factors of production have empowered multinational corporations and NGOs (to say nothing of evangelistic cults of all denominations), the free flow of destructive technology has empowered criminal organizations and terrorist cells, the Viking raiders of our time. These can operate wherever they choose, from Hamburg to Gaza. By contrast, the writ of the international community is not global. It is, in fact, increasingly confined to a few strategic cities such as Kabul and Sarajevo. Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the one of the ninth century. For the world is roughly 25 times more populous, so that friction between the world's "tribes" is bound to be greater. Technology has transformed production; now societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of mineral oil that are known to be finite. Technology has changed destruction, too: Now it is possible not just to sack a city, but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization has been raising living standards, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. Deglobalization--which is what a new Dark Age would amount to--would lead to economic depression. As the U.S. sought to protect itself after a second 9/11 devastated Houston, say, it would inevitably become a less open society. And as Europe's Muslim enclaves grow, infiltration of the EU by Islamist extremists could become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to breaking point. Meanwhile, an economic crisis in China could plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that have undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out, and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the Dark Age would be felt on the margins of the waning great powers. With ease, the terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers and cruise liners while we concentrate our efforts on making airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in Korea and Kashmir; perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. The prospect of an apolar world should frighten us a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the U.S. is to retreat from the role of global hegemon--its fragile self-belief dented by minor reversals--its critics must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony. The alternative to unpolarity may not be multipolarity at all. It may be a global vacuum of power. Be careful what you wish for.

Impact Scenario: Isolationism

A. Soft Power is necessary to check downward spirals in international affairs. These would culminate in American isolationism

Nye, Professor of International Relations, Harvard, '04

[Joseph S., "Soft Power and American Foreign Policy," Summer 2004, *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 119, Issue 2; page 255, proquest, download date: 9-21-07]

It is not smart to discount soft power as just a question of image, public relations, and ephemeral popularity. As I argued earlier, it is a form of power—a means of obtaining desired outcomes. When we discount the importance of our attractiveness to other countries, we pay a price. Most important, if the United States is so unpopular in a country that being pro-American is a kiss of death in their domestic politics, political leaders are unlikely to make concessions to help us. Turkey, Mexico, and Chile were prime examples in the run-up to the Iraq war in March 2003. When American policies lose their legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of others, attitudes of distrust tend to fester and further reduce our leverage. For example, after September 11, there was an outpouring of sympathy from Germans for the United States, and Germany joined a military campaign against the al Qaeda network. But as the United States geared up for the unpopular Iraq war, Germans expressed widespread disbelief about the reasons the United States gave for going to war, such as the alleged connection of Iraq to al Qaeda and the imminence of the threat of weapons of mass destruction. German suspicions were reinforced by what they saw as biased American media coverage during the war and by the failure to find weapons or prove the connection to al Qaeda right after the war. The combination fostered a climate in which conspiracy theories flourished. By July 2003, one-third of Germans under the age of thirty said that they thought the American government might even have staged the original September 11 attacks.¹¹ Absurd views feed upon each other, and paranoia can be contagious. American attitudes toward foreigners harden, and we begin to believe that the rest of the world really does hate us. Some Americans begin to hold grudges, to mistrust all Muslims, to boycott French wines and rename french fries, to spread and believe false rumors.¹² In turn, foreigners see Americans as uninformed and insensitive to anyone's interests but their own. They see our media wrapped in the American flag. Some Americans, in turn, succumb to residual strands of isolationism, saying that if others choose to see us that way, "to hell with 'em." If foreigners are going to be like that, who cares whether we are popular or not. But to the extent that we allow ourselves to become isolated, we embolden enemies such as al Qaeda. Such reactions undercut our soft power and are self-defeating in terms of the outcomes we want.

Impact Scenario: Isolationism

B. U.S. withdraw and isolationism would cause competition, prolif, and many scenarios for nuclear war

Posen, Professor of Political Science, M.I.T., and Ross, Professor of National Security Studies, Naval War College, '97

[Barry and Andrew, *International Security*, Winter, page: lexis-nexis]

The United States can, more easily than most, go it alone. Yet we do not find the arguments of the neo-isolationists compelling. Their strategy serves U.S. interests only if they are narrowly construed. First, though the neo-isolationists have a strong case in their argument that the United States is currently quite secure, disengagement is unlikely to make the United States more secure, and would probably make it less secure. The disappearance of the United States from the world stage would likely precipitate a good deal of competition abroad for security. Without a U.S. presence, aspiring regional hegemons would see more opportunities. States formerly defended by the United States would have to look to their own military power; local arms competitions are to be expected. Proliferation of nuclear weapons would intensify if the U.S. nuclear guarantee were withdrawn. Some states would seek weapons of mass destruction because they were simply unable to compete conventionally with their neighbors. This new flurry of competitive behavior would probably energize many hypothesized immediate causes of war, including preemptive motives, preventive motives, economic motives, and the propensity for miscalculation. There would like be more war. Weapons of mass destruction might be used in some of the wars, with unpleasant effects even for those not directly involved.

Impact Scenario: Global Democracy

Soft Power and Multilateralism necessary to building and sustaining democratic governments worldwide

Nye, Professor of International Relations, Harvard, '04

[Joseph S., "Soft Power and American Foreign Policy," Summer, *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume. 119, Issue 2; page 255]

Ironically, however, the only way to achieve the type of transformation that the neoconservatives seek is by working with others and avoiding the backlash that arises when the United States appears on the world stage as an imperial power acting unilaterally. What is more, because democracy cannot be imposed by force and requires a considerable time to take root, the most likely way to obtain staying power from the American public is through developing international legitimacy and burden sharing with allies and institutions. For Jacksonians like secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, this may not matter. They would prefer to punish the dictator and come home rather than engage in tedious nation building. For example, in September 2003, Rumsfeld said of Iraq, "I don't believe it's our job to reconstruct the country."³¹ But for serious neoconservatives, like Deputy Defense secretary Paul Wolfowitz, their impatience with institutions and allies may undercut their own objectives. They understand the importance of soft power but fail to appreciate all its dimensions and dynamics.

Global democracy is crucial to preventing all major problems on Earth; the alternative is proliferation, war, and global ecosystem collapse

Diamond, Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution, '95

[Larry, Ph.D. from Stanford, former Vanderbilt instructor, *Promoting Democracy in the 1990s*, p. 6-7]

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

Impact Scenario: WMD Proliferation

Soft Power is key to solving proliferation

Nye, Professor of International Relations, Harvard, '04

[Joseph S., "Soft Power and American Foreign Policy," Summer, *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume. 119, Issue 2; page 255]

According to the National Security Strategy, the greatest threats the American people face are transnational terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and particularly their combination. Yet, meeting the challenge posed by transnational military organizations that could acquire weapons of mass destruction requires the cooperation of other countries -and cooperation is strengthened by soft power. Similarly, efforts to promote democracy in Iraq and elsewhere will require the help of others. Reconstruction in Iraq and peacekeeping in failed states are far more likely to succeed and to be less costly if shared with others rather than appearing as American imperial occupation. The fact that the United States squandered its soft power in the way that it went to war meant that the aftermath turned out to be much more costly than it need have been.

Proliferation leads to nuclear crises, war, and the end of civilization

Taylor '02

[Stuart, Senior Writer at The National Journal, and Editor at Newsweek, Legal Times, September 16, lexis]

The truth is, no matter what we do about Iraq, if we don't stop proliferation, another five or 10 potentially unstable nations may go nuclear before long, making it ever more likely that one or more bombs will be set off anonymously on our soil by terrorists or a terrorist government. Even an airtight missile defense would be useless against a nuke hidden in a truck, a shipping container, or a boat.

[Continues...]

Unless we get serious about stopping proliferation, we are headed for "a world filled with nuclear-weapons states, where every crisis threatens to go nuclear," where "the survival of civilization truly is in question from day to day," and where "it would be impossible to keep these weapons out of the hands of terrorists, religious cults, and criminal organizations." So writes Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr., a moderate Republican who served as a career arms-controller under six presidents and led the successful Clinton administration effort to extend the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The only way to avoid such a grim future, he suggests in his memoir, *Disarmament Sketches*, is for the United States to lead an international coalition against proliferation by showing an unprecedented willingness to give up the vast majority of our own nuclear weapons, excepting only those necessary to deter nuclear attack by others.

Soft Power Bogus, No Effects

Soft power is a bogus concept – soft power does not have any specific policy effects

Blechman '05

[Barry M., Founder and President of DFI International Inc., a research and consulting company in Washington, DC, "Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics," Winter, Political Science Quarterly, Volume 119, Issue 4; pg. 680-68]

Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics by Joseph S. Nye. New York, Public Affairs, 2004. 208 pp. \$25.00. Joseph Nye has done his usual masterful job in this elegant monograph, describing the many sources of influence in international relations and reminding readers that excessive reliance on military or economic instruments of policy can often trigger backlashes that harm the nation's interests in the longer term. Nye points out that rather than either coercing others to share our objectives or buying their agreement with economic incentives, it is better for the United States to get what it wants because others share our goals. Soft power, he says, is more than influence or persuasion, "it is also the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence" (p. 6). Much of the book is devoted to descriptions of the sources of soft power in the United States and other countries, including the nation's values and the styles of individual behavior expressed in the dominant culture and transmitted through both commercial activities (Hollywood movies, for example) and personal contacts, and the nation's policies, particularly when they reflect values that are widely shared around the world. Thus, Nye argues, the United States won the Cold War in part because of the attractiveness of the American form of government and economy, and because American values, or American soft power, eventually came to dominate global perceptions of the two superpowers and induced others to want to share in our vision of the world. Although Nye makes a persuasive case, in the end, the book is unsatisfying because of inherent limitations in the concept of soft power. It is a form of power, yes, but not an instrument of power that can be deployed in specific situations or even one that can be shaped in a meaningful way by the government. Soft power exists, and may be influenced by governmental choices, but it is more an existential factor in the policy environment than something policy makers can utilize to their advantage. A nation's "attractiveness" to others is not a factor that can be exploited in any coherent way. Indeed, the chapter "Wielding Soft Power" is devoted solely to public diplomacy—the various means available to the government to communicate the nation's policies and values. But in our interdependent and interactive world, government-inspired communications of all types are only a tiny fraction of the information received by people around the world about the United States. Even if the United States spent a more reasonable amount on its public diplomacy than it does now, as Nye rightfully suggests, it's diplomacy would still be dwarfed by the private sources of information in the United States and abroad, and by the huge volume of interactions among citizens of all nations that take place independent of government actions or inactions.

Soft Power Bogus, No Effects

Soft Power does nothing – people can like American culture and products but still act to oppose American policies and goals

Ferguson, Professor of History, Harvard, '03

[Niall, , "Power," Foreign Policy, January/February, Issue 134; page 18+, 6 pgs, proquest, accessed 9-28-07]

"The United States Exerts Influence Through Soft Power" Not really. Harvard political scientist Joseph S. Nye Jr. coined the concept of "soft power"-the notion that nontraditional forces such as cultural and commercial goods can exert influence in world affairs. And since so many of the world's largest multinationals are of U.S. origin, some argue that the products they sell make American culture attractive and are the key to the real power the United States wields. But the trouble with soft power is that it's, well, soft. All over the Islamic world kids enjoy (or would like to enjoy) bottles of Coke, Big Macs, CDs by Britney Spears and DVDS starring Tom Cruise. Do any of these things make them love the United States more? Strangely not. Well, perhaps it is not so strange. In the 19th century, Great Britain pioneered the use of soft power, though it projected its culture through the sermons of missionaries and the commentaries in Anglophone newspapers. Yet it was precisely from the most Anglicized parts of the indigenous populations of the British Empire that nationalist movements sprang. The archetype was the Bengali babu-better able to quote William Shakespeare than the average expatriate Brit-who worked for the British by day but plotted their overthrow by night. Antiglobalization protesters smashing McDonald's windows while clad in Gap khakis and Nike trainers are today's version of the same Janus-- faced phenomenon.

Soft Power over-rated. It does NOT affect actual individual policy choices

Blechman '05

[Barry M., Founder and President of DFI International Inc., a research and consulting company in Washington, DC, "Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics," Winter, Political Science Quarterly, Volume 119, Issue 4; pg. 680-68]

Soft power contributes importantly to the nation's ability to achieve its goals in the world. But I don't think Professor Nye would disagree that soft power also has its limitations. U.S. attractiveness to others will never be shaped fundamentally by the government, nor can it be tapped for use in particular situations. Nor will soft power be a dominant consideration in situations in which there are real differences of interest and perspective. In these cases, harder forms of national strength will continue to dominate policy choices.

Uniqueness: Soft Power High

Soft Power is high and experiencing a renewal in Status Quo

The Economist '07

[“Demons Jangle Americans’ Nerves, but US is still No. 1 Superpower,” July 04, 2007, lexis-nexis]

The surveys that show America's soft power to be less respected than it used to be also show the continuing universal appeal of its values - especially freedom and openness. Even the immigrants and foreign goods that so worry some Americans are tributes to that appeal (by contrast, the last empire to build a wall on its border, the Soviet one, was trying to keep its subjects in). Nor is it an accident that anti-Americanism has fed off those instances, such as Guantanamo Bay, where America has seemed most un-American. This is the multiplier effect that Bush missed: Win the battle for hearts and minds and you do not need as much hard power to get your way. That lesson is worth bearing in mind when it comes to the challenge of China. China is likely to be more and more in America's face, whether buying American firms, winning Olympic gold or blasting missiles into space. Merely by growing, China is disrupting the politics of the Pacific. But that does not mean that it is automatically on track to overtake America. Its politics are fragile and America's lead is immense. Moreover, economics is not a zero-sum game: so far, a bigger China has helped enrich America. An America that stays open to China - an America that sticks to American values - is much more likely to help fashion the China it wants. If America were a stock, it would be a "buy": an undervalued market leader, in need of new management. But that points to its last great strength. More than any rival, America corrects itself. Under pressure from voters, Bush already has rediscovered some of the charms of multilateralism; he is talking about climate change; a Middle East peace initiative is possible. Next year's presidential election offers a chance for renewal. Such corrections are not automatic: something (a misadventure in Iran?) may yet compound the misery of Iraq in the same way Watergate followed Vietnam. But America recovered from the 1970s. It will bounce back stronger again.

Uniqueness: Soft Power High

Recent shifts in US foreign policy is increasing US soft power

Nye, Professor of International Relations, Harvard, '07

(Joseph S., "Washington is learning that not every problem is like a nail," Daily Star (Lebanon), March 16, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=5&article_id=80523 accessed: 9-27-07)

Yet it is on this bottom board that we find most of the greatest challenges today. The only way to grapple with these problems is through cooperation with others, and that requires the soft power of attraction as well as the hard power of coercion. There is no simple military solution that will produce the outcomes we want. The new unilateralists who dominated Bush's first administration made the mistake of thinking that the unipolar distribution of power in the military context was sufficient to guide foreign policy. They were like a young boy with a hammer who thinks that every problem resembles a nail. The danger of their approach is now obvious. Whoever plays a three-dimensional game by focusing on only one board is bound to lose in the long run. Fortunately, the pendulum has begun to swing back toward cooperation. In Bush's second term, some of the most extreme unilateralists have departed from the Government, and Bush has approached difficult problems such as North Korea or Iran with a more multilateral approach than during his first term. Likewise, for all the complaints about the United Nations, the US and others turned to UN peacekeepers to sort out the mess after the Lebanon War last year. The Iraq War, in particular, increased public awareness of the mistakes in Bush's first term, but other issues are changing as well. Americans now view cooperative action on global climate change more favourably. Similarly, the threat of pandemics means that Americans may come to recognise the importance of a stronger World Health Organisation, just as the problem of nuclear proliferation is increasing awareness of the importance of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Soft Power High in Africa in SQ

Soft Power already high in SSA -- Africans view US and American policy favorably

PBS News Hour '07

[PBS, "Global Discontent with US Increasing; US Works to Bolster Image," June 27, Transcript, accessed 9-22-07, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/jan-june07/abroad_06-27.html]

JUDY WOODRUFF: And we want to make sure the audience knows this is not universal; there are parts of the world that see the U.S. more favorably, Africa. ANDREW KOHUT: Yes, what our conclusion is, that in many parts of the world, anti-Americanism has deepened, but it hasn't widened. In Africa, for example, we still see Africans expressing favorable views of the United States; in Ivory Coast, 88 percent; in Kenya, 87 percent. Large numbers of Africans saying good things about the United States generally, and when we ask them about the influence of the United States in their country, they say positive things.

Soft Power Increase Timeframe

Decades to repair U.S. image and soft power

Freeman, former Ambassador, '06

[Chas W., President of the Middle East Policy Council (MEPC), former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia (1989-92), former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (1993-94), "Why Not Let Them Hate Us, as Long as They Fear Us?" Remarks to the United States Information Agency Alumni Association, October 4, <http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/71.htm> download date: 9-25-07]

The second observation is that the answer to the question of whether we can defend ourselves and persuade others to support us as we do so lies first and foremost in our own thoughts and deeds. Muslim extremists cannot destroy us and what we have stood for, but we can surely forfeit our moral convictions and so discredit our values that we destroy ourselves. We have lost international support not because foreigners hate our values but because they believe we are repudiating them and behaving contrary to them. To prevail, we must remember who we are and what we stand for. If we can rediscover and reaffirm the identity and values that made our republic so great, we will find much support abroad, including among those in the Muslim world we now wrongly dismiss as enemies rather than friends.

To rediscover public diplomacy and to practice it successfully, in other words, we must repudiate Caligula's maxim and replace it with our traditional respect for the opinion of mankind. I do not think it is beyond us to do so. We are a far better and more courageous people than we currently appear. But when we do restore ourselves to mental balance, we will, I fear, find that decades are required – it will take decades – to rebuild the appeal and influence our post-9/11 psychoses took a mere five years to destroy. In the process of reaffirming our traditions, as I am confident we shall, Americans may well find a renewed role for an independent agency that can facilitate the projection of our democracy and its values abroad.